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ABSTRACT
This case discusses the management and control of a large enterprise-wide implementation of an ERP system while the
business model and corporate culture were shaping and being shaped by that implementation. In 1995, the Enterprise
Networks Systems business unit of AT&T faced a triad of problems caused by its legacy IT infrastructure, including the lack
of timely, accurate financial and operating data, looming Y2K issues and systems capacity issues that were beginning to
limit growth. A business plan for change was developed and approved. A project team was assembled to replace 25 years
of legacy systems architecture (400+ systems) with a new enterprise systems architecture. The team was to act as change
agent by supplanting a myriad of business processes and people practices that were seen as impediments to future growth
and profitability. This case describes the design, development and deployment of one of the largest ERP implementations.
The project required the implementation of standardized business processes and people practices for 30,000+ associates
globally while minimizing the impacts on 1.3 million customers and on shareholders. Simultaneously, upper management
set out on a strategy of creating a virtual business by outsourcing major business functions, including IT, Manufacturing and
Distribution, and major parts of the sales and service operations. Other major events included the spin-offs of Lucent
Technologies and Avaya.
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point that was too high. The advent of new technologies
and new types of supplier firms could enable the business
to focus on those parts of the value chain for which it had a
comparative advantage, such as R&D, marketing, and sales
and service.

1. CASE SUMMARY
The Enterprise Network Systems business unit 8 of AT&T
had been through several reincarnations since its inception
in 1983. Layers of IT systems technologies had been
created over the years to support various business
structures and strategies as the communications industry
evolved from a regulated monopoly structure to a
competitive structure, and as the underlying technology
evolved from analog voice to digital voice to integrated
voice-data applications.
By 1995, the layers of
functionally oriented IT systems, which tied the vertically
integrated, traditionally managed functional structure of
the business together, were a barrier to the future growth of
the business and formed a cost floor with a breakeven

In 1995, AT&T set up the reengineering team to replace
the legacy IT infrastructure with a new ERP-enabled one.
In 1996, Lucent Technologies spun-off from AT&T. It
announced the outsourcing of information technologies to
IBM Global Services, “including management of
mainframe data centers, much of its systems applications
maintenance, and provide support for its desktop systems
worldwide.” (Lucent 1996) This first step of outsourcing
key functions set the pattern for the future of the integrated
vertical structure. i.e., business functions that were not
competitive would be outsourced to firms that were
considered at the top of their respective industries.

8

We use the name Enterprise Networks Systems as the
business unit precursor to Avaya.
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The business case did not include the business unit’s
international operations, certain aspects of the business
unit’s services operations, or systems supporting the R&D
community.

The next target Lucent Technologies considered was the
channel structure of Enterprise Networks Systems.
Enterprise Networks Systems marketed its products
through both direct and indirect (dealers and distributors)
channels. Approximately 90% of the business was
conducted through the direct channel with dealers
providing complementary market coverage. The U.S.
direct channel was divided into two major divisions: one
focused on selling to small business and one selling to
large businesses.

The project begun in January 1996 was concluded in
September 2001. Over that period, the project had three
leaders: 1) Ron Joaquim for Phase 1 from January 1996 to
August 1999; 2) Jim Flinton for Phase 2 from August 1999
to August 2000; and 3) John Stevenson from August 2000
to September 2001.

On April 2, 2000, the small business division spun off to
Expanets, Inc., a partner entity of NorthWestern
Corporation (Hersch 2000).
By the mid-1990s,
technological change had reduced the size of the physical
product produced and competition had reduced the amount
of product required from Enterprise Networks Systems
manufacturing operations. This left the business unit with
an aging manufacturing infrastructure and excess capacity.
On February 20, 2000, it announced a deal to outsource
manufacturing to Celestica, Inc. (Celestica 2001)

3. STRATEGY AND TACTICS
In 1995, Enterprise Network Systems was comprised of
35,000+ (SEC 2000, 2001) employees in 90 countries. It
sold products and services to a customer base of 1.3
million customers with 90% of them in the U.S.
Employees were located at more than 600 sites in the U.S.
Enterprise Network Systems derived 80% of its revenue
from U.S. operations. It manufactured and repaired
products at three major facilities in the U.S., manufactured
them at three sites outside of the U.S., and repaired them at
multiple locations globally.

In October 2000, Avaya spun from Lucent Technologies.
Avaya continued to evaluate various functions and
outsourced parts or all of real estate management,
procurement, and much of the remainder of information
systems. By October 2001, this left Avaya as a virtual
company with the key business functions of R&D,
marketing , services, large company sales, channel
management, and contract management of the outsourced
functions. The glue that now held Avaya together were
contracts, an integrated enterprise resource planning
system, and the integrating functionality of the World
Wide Web.

In January 1996, Ron Joaquim was named Vice President,
Reengineering, to lead the reengineering effort. He
assembled a small planning team to develop a strategy.
The team included managers from the key business
functions, including sales, service, manufacturing, market
management, finance, and human resources. The business
chose Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) as the consultant.
PWC facilitated the design of the strategy, provided the
initial design methodology and led the initial design effort.
The team built the reengineering strategy constructed on a
series of principles. The most important principle and the
only principle not violated was “One customer, one
system.” This founding principle drove the strategy. At its
highest level the strategy was to convert the products, and
distribution and manufacturing infrastructure on a
customer segment basis (small, large, multinational, and
international customers) and then to convert sales and
services teams and the customer base associated with each
segment.

2. THE GOAL OF THE PROJECT
In 1995, AT&T’s Enterprise Network Systems set out to
replace 25 years of U.S. IT infrastructure consisting of
layers of legacy mainframe systems and a spaghetti of
manufacturing, distribution, sales, services and marketing
applications that supported the vertically integrated
business. A small team, which included IT and several
business leaders, created a business case and received
approval by business unit executives in 4Q1995. The
business case included the selection of an enterprise
resource planning (ERP) system from SAP AG, a major
supplier of ERP solutions. The approved business case set
forth the following goal: A team was to transform
Enterprise Networks Systems by replacing 25 years of U.S.
business processes, people practices, and enabling systems
technologies. They were to replace it with an end-to-end,
customer-focused value chain that delivers products and
services on time and at least cost. The delivery of those
goods and services was to be based on internal and
external customer requirements. The project was to
achieve cost savings of at least $125M per year. The
project was to begin in January 1996 and to be completed
by September 1999. Finally, the project was required to
minimize the disruption of the business units operations.

4. BUILDING BLOCKS OF CHANGE
During 1996, Ron and the strategy planning leaders
established team objectives, assembled teams, built
requirements, developed an applications architecture
roadmap, and developed a realization process to configure
and deploy SAP and the associated architecture. In
addition, Ron and the team leaders worked with each of the
business leaders to gain the necessary functional business
support.
4.1 Team Objectives
The existing business processes, people practices and
legacy systems architecture were generating results that
were unacceptable to internal operations, customers and
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testing the SAP software, and deploying the new business
processes, people practices and enabling technologies to
their respect business constituencies.

shareholders. For example, integrated operations and
financial data did not exist. Only partial operations data
were available on a real time basis in manufacturing,
distribution, sales and services. The financial information
that these operational results drove were not available until
the end of the third week after the beginning of the next
month. Operational effect and financial consequence were
separated from each other for the business unit and for the
corporate parent. Therefore, financial book close was
manual, slow and fraught with potential errors. The book
close process consisted of the reconciliation of data across
multiple financial and operational systems. In addition,
25% of large customer make-to-order shipments were
being shipped incompletely or late. Of the most complex
communications orders and all international orders, none
shipped on time or completely.
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Figure 1: Targeted Enhancements
An additional inefficiency was the use of a late 1970’s
vintage product configurator.
The configurator was
accurate approximately 60% of the time. The sales team
used this to configure products for technical assurance and
to price configurations for customer quotes and orders.
The root causes of these inaccuracies were incorrect and
untimely modifications to the configurator during product
realization updates and introductions and dual material
coding structures. The marketing and sales team (and
therefore customers) used one coding language; and the
R&D, manufacturing, distribution and services team, a
different language. This lack of common product and
service languages meant the creation of a multitude of code
translation tables.
The result was that orders seldom
reflected what the customer ordered, what the factory
manufactured, what services installed or what the customer
was billed. Finally, when a customer called into a service
center for help, the inconsistency in the coding language
meant that customer and the customer service agent
frequently spoke two different languages about which
products were on the customer’s premise and which ones
were causing the problem.
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Figure 2: Reengineering Team Organization Chart:
1996-1999
The senior leaders assembled teams of key knowledge
workers from the functional organizations based on their
knowledge of the business, on their ability to translate
business requirements into technical requirements, on their
acceptability to the business community, and their
willingness to create change. The business teams were
accountable for developing the future state business
processes and people practices, converting the
requirements into technical specifications, configuring and
testing the SAP software, and deploying the new business
processes, people practices and enabling technologies to
their respect business constituencies.

From these, and many other problems, the team developed
objectives. These included improving the quality and
accuracy of the quote to cash process, reducing the time to
configure and process orders, eliminating order rework in
sales manufacturing, distribution and installation, reducing
book close time, reducing billing errors, improving
accounts receivable collections, reducing IT costs,
reducing services installation time, improving on-time,
accurate shipping performance. Figure 1 provides the
targeted enhancements, by stage of the value chain.

In parallel to the business team, the Information
Technologies (IT) team leader assembled a team to support
the business teams, provided the initial, transitional, and
final state technical architecture, as well as led the design,
development, testing and deployment of the interfaces
necessary to enable the transformation and for
decommissioning the legacy systems.

The senior leaders assembled teams of key knowledge
workers from the functional organizations based on their
knowledge of the business, on their ability to translate
business requirements into technical requirements, on their
acceptability to the business community, and their
willingness to create change. The business teams were
accountable for developing the future state business
processes and people practices, converting the
requirements into technical specifications, configuring and

The leader of the project office acted as the Chief
Operations Officer for the project. The project office set
project management standards including those for the
standardized realization process and for results reporting,
developed and coordinated the planning and project
management of each release of process, people practice
and systems functionality, and managed the integrated
meeting process. Each team managed its own timeline
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End to end cycle time for this phase of the project was 16
months.

within the context of the overall release schedule. A set of
daily, weekly, and biweekly team and across teams
meetings served to integrate and maintain control over the
project.

In the third year of the project, the team was required to
modify the structure of SAP and the project (release two)
to accommodate changes required by Lucent Technologies,
when it decided to run the business as a holding
company 11 . The existing systems infrastructure made this
decision difficult to implement and manage and in late
1997, Lucent Technologies decided to adopt SAP for its
ERP system. The planned architecture included an
umbrella of corporate functions into which the business
units were simply “plugged in”. This plug and play
architecture was to provide the capability to acquire (buy)
and divest (sell) companies as required by the strategies
and tactics of the business. Headquarters and functional
teams from each business unit developed requirements for
finance (Francesco 1998), treasury, procurement, and data
standards common functions. Critical planning included
splitting common business functions between headquarters
and business units, i.e., which business functions were
going to be executed in the business units and which
functions were to be accomplished within Lucent
Technologies headquarters or both. Additionally, a new
data coding structure was developed to insure that there
was a minimum of data structures within Lucent.

4.3 Realization Process
A standard realization process was established (Figure 3).
Each of the teams developed a set of business requirements
from their respective business functions. The requirements
teams then developed an integrated value chain by working
backwards from the customers through the value chain to
insure that internal inputs and outputs corresponded across
functions. This integrated value chain formed the basis for
configuring SAP and the applications architecture 9 .
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The team integrated a front-end technical product
configurator by Trilogy, Inc. with SAP and designed a
realization process by which prices, technical rules and
product codes were loaded simultaneously in both the new
architecture and the legacy architecture. The combination
of these factors, i.e., the new configurator, new pricing,
coding and configurator change management process, and
integration between the Trilogy based configurator and
SAP, dramatically improved the timeliness and quality of
the quote to cash process.
The systems design,
development and deployment cycle time for Release 2 of
the ERP functionality was 12 months.

Figure 3: Integrated Release Process
4.4 Transformation Of The Core
The core business was transformed in three releases. In
release one, Enterprise Network Systems sales operations
to small and midsized companies were converted. The
business unit serviced over 1.2 million customers in the
U.S. (including Alaska and Hawaii). The team chose to
change out this portion of the business first to improve
customer satisfaction and profit margins, as well as to test
and improve the systems realization and change
management processes. The large size of the task required
the conversion of the sales teams and customers in waves
by region. The data conversion team converted customer
data from the legacy system to SAP 10 . Then, the change
management team worked with the sales channel to insure
that they could service customers in SAP before moving to
the next customer set. The conversion cycle time was from
2 – 4 months, depending upon: the number of sales
locations, the size and complexity of the customer base,
and sales team readiness and willingness for conversion to
the new processes, people practices and SAP technologies.

In the late 1980s, Enterprise Network Systems had
converted its large customer, PBX 12 manufacturing
operations to a make-to-order operation based on a fixed
manufacturing interval. A series of functional systems,
which required manual intervention in order to insure order
quality and timeliness, supported the order process from
the field sales teams to the Denver manufacturing
operation and delivery of the order to the customer site.
Release 3 converted these operations to SAP. This required
plugging SAP into the existing order flow process and
unplugging the existing manufacturing and distribution
systems.

9

This approach did allow the team to get “buy-in” for the
design; unfortunately, it also leads down the path to mass
customization of the software.
10
The data conversion process was recognized as “best
practice” by SAP due to the detailed step-by-step planning
and implementation process built by the data conversion
team

11

It acquired some 38 companies between 1996 and 2001.
Private Branch Exchanges (PBX) are voice switches that
larger businesses require for managing voice traffic within
a location and to outside communications networks.
12
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In preparation for the conversion of the Denver Works
manufacturing and distribution functions to SAP new
manufacturing processes were designed to provide for
flexible order intervals based on customer requirements. A
second major step was the conversion of the current coding
structure to the SAP bill of materials structure. The team
chose to flash cut the conversion over a three-day
weekend. When the flash cut to the new manufacturing
processes, people practices and SAP occurred, the project
team was assigned to supplement the operators and the line
management to work out problems with the cut. The
change management team supported the operations team
through a 60-day operations change process and in parallel
worked with the manufacturing management team through
a 90-day period. This allowed the team to work out bugs
in the manufacturing and distribution processes and then to
streamline the management reporting processes enabled by
SAP. In the end, shipping performance improved from
75% on time and accurate to well over 90%. Order rework
before, during and after manufacturing was dramatically
reduced since manual intervention were eliminated. The
team completed the end-to-end realization project in 14
months.

team divided the plan into two stages: Create Avaya and
complete the ERP.
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Figure 4: IT Applications Team Organization Chart:
2000 – 2001

4.6 Creating Avaya
Avaya required the creation of corporate headquarters
functions including finance, treasury, human resources,
procurement, legal, information technologies and public
relations. These functions existed at Lucent Technologies
with satellite functions within each business unit. The
team’s new focus was on conversion and deployment of
existing functionality, and less on creation of new business
processes and people practices. The joint business unit and
Lucent Technologies headquarters team converted finance,
treasury and procurement functionality from a Lucent
Technologies version of SAP to an Avaya version of SAP.
A separate HR IT team converted human resources
functionality in PeopleSoft to SAPHR. The plan included
the completion of outsourcing of manufacturing to
Celestica (Lucent 2000). The end-to-end realization project
was completed in 6 months, with the exception of HR,
which required two releases of functionality over 14
months.

4.5 Business Transformation
As 1999 progressed, the pressure to grow revenues was
increasing as well as the growth of competing business
requirements for e-enabled business capabilities A group
was set up to e-enable the business. To fund the group, the
reengineering teams and legacy IT teams were merged and
the savings gained from combining the two teams was
used to fund the new e-team. In September 1999, Jim
Flinton was named as CIO to lead the next phase of the
project. As one of the first steps, he restructured the team
to achieve these goals. The reengineering teams and legacy
systems IT teams were merged and reconfigured and
became accountable for the simultaneous design,
development, configuring, testing, data conversion and
deployment of multiple releases (Figure 4). In addition,
each team was now accountable for decommissioning of
the associated legacy infrastructure. With the integration
and the reduction in budget, the structure of the team was
modified 1) to reduce cost, 2) to improve speed and 3) to
increase the accountability of the team to the business for
producing smaller and more frequent deliverables.

The new headquarters functionality provided the same
“plug and play” functionality for the new business unit as
for Lucent Technologies. Into this new functionality, the
business integrated both the Enterprise Networks Systems
and the Connectivity Solutions business units into SAP.
This presented a problem from a business-reengineering
standpoint. The team had installed Enterprise Networks
Systems functionality on SAP V3.1i of software (which at
this point looked like middleware rather than an ERP
system) and had proposed SAP V4.2b for the international
conversion and for human resources functionality. The
team decided to convert Connectivity Solutions to SAP
V4.2b and set up a standalone version of the business
processes, people practices and enabling software and
hardware. The team completed the end-to-end realization
project in 6 months going live prior to October 1, 2001.
The new corporation came into existence on October 1,
2000.

On April 2, 2000, Lucent Technology announced that it
was spinning off its Enterprise Networks Systems business
unit and a portion of the Networks Systems wire division.
The new Avaya chairman, Donald Peterson requested an
estimate of the costs that would be need to complete the
deployment of SAP and decommissioning of the legacy
architecture by October 1, 2000, the date the new business
was to go live. The team faced a difficult problem since
SAP was now “middleware” in a legacy systems
architecture and the team was under pressure to continue to
manage its cost structure.
The re-configured team
developed a plan to complete the implementation of the
new SAP infrastructure by July 2001. Jim Flinton and the

4.7 Completing the ERP
The end game consisted of converting the U.S. large
customer sales and service force and associated customers
to SAP, converting the International sales and service force
and International customers, as well as multinational
customers, and decommissioning the legacy architecture.
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As part of the transition from Lucent Technologies to
Avaya, Inc., a new IT organization had to be created to
manage those functions previously managed by Lucent
Technologies headquarters functions, including voice and
data networks, server and mainframe data centers, and
desktop and laptop access to the new applications. Jim
Flinton began that transition and handed off both the
reengineering project and the new IT functions to a newly
named CIO, John Stevenson.

The planning for the conversion began in the fall of 2000
when a team consisting of representatives from each group
supporting the legacy infrastructure and IBM Global
Services (who actually maintained and supported the
systems) was assembled. The team was given the charge
to decommission the applications and retire or redeploy
hardware. For the most part the systems were contained on
older NCR servers, AT&T 3B servers or IBM mainframes.
None of which could be reused. The software was
decommissioned by the end of September 2001.

As the spin-off from Lucent Technologies was completed
in October 2000, the team focused on completing the
conversion of the large customer base and indirect channel
customers. This entailed conversion of back office
operations, sales teams and customer records. In addition,
it required the conversion of the offer configurators to the
new Trilogy configurators. The lessons learned during the
previous releases were applied and the speed of the
conversion to SAP was reduced (Avaya 2001).

In July 2001, the economy was in the second year of a
recession. IT costs had dropped dramatically from over
9% of revenues to under 4.5%. Revenue forecasts in the
spring 2001 were not encouraging as buying from the IT
industry slowed globally. John Stevenson and the IT
leadership team knew that the combined Legacy, SAP,
reengineering and IBM global services teams were more
than was required to manage the new hardware and
software infrastructure. In addition, the team was still
comprised of business managers (from the original
reengineering team) and IT professionals. The future team
needed to be comprised of IT professionals and a small
group of business/IT managers to interface with the
functional leadership for purposes of managing future
business requirements for IT functionality.

The original business case did not include conversion of
non-U.S. operations to SAP, but by 2000, Avaya
conducted 20% of its business outside of the U.S. in
approximately 90 countries, with approximately a 60/40
percentage split between direct and indirect channels. The
largest share of this business was conducted in Europe and
the Middle East with the remainder in Asia and the
Americas (outside of the U.S.). In addition, it had a series
of joint ventures in Brazil, India, Mexico and Australia.
The international business grew by fits and starts
beginning in the early 1990’s. Each country and region
had developed local solutions in country for handling
finance, ordering, customer care, and international specific
capabilities for customs and duties. These local solutions
were loosely tied to the U.S. systems. Large customer
orders were configured manually or through a standalone,
Trilogy based configurator and then sent to Denver for
manufacture and shipment.

As part of an overall Avaya program, John and the IT
leadership team adopted a number of retirement, force
reduction and career management programs. Career
development programs were developed for the IT
professionals, and the plans implemented. One of the
paths opened up for the IT professional occurred when
Avaya and IBM expanded their outsourcing relationship to
include management of the new SAP infrastructure. A
large part of the team moved to IBM Global Services
under that outsourcing arrangement.
And the project was completed.

It was clear that the international business needed to be
converted. In order to meet the timeframes required by
Avaya, a separate standalone team was used to configure
SAP V4.2b and deploy it to each country. In addition,
Deloitte and Touche was chosen as the consultant for the
conversion. Data was converted from a myriad of systems
ranging from desktop PC applications to server-based
databases to paper based accounting ledgers. The design,
development and deployment began in spring 2000 and
were completed in August 2002, or approximately 16
months.

5. CONCULSIONS
The project that began in the 4th quarter of 1995 ended in
August 2001, two years overdue and at an additional cost
of more than $175 million. At a minimum, it did achieve
its goal of saving $125 million a year. The project
replaced 25 years of business processes, people practices
and legacy systems and applications. It improved Quote to
Cash speed and reduced cycle time from 3 in 4 customer
orders configured, ordered, shipped, installed and billed
accurately on time to 19 out of 20. Order processing speed
was reduced to minutes from days. At least $20 million in
annual order rework was eliminated. Offer realization time
was reduced.

The legacy infrastructure remained virtually intact
throughout the conversion to the SAP-enabled architecture.
Some minor systems and a few major manufacturing
systems were decommissioned over the period 1996 to
2000, but most of the legacy architecture was still in place.
Only when all U.S. and International customers had been
converted, the small business sold off, and manufacturing
outsourced was Avaya able to decommission the legacy
structure.

The project team achieved end-to-end data visibility. This
alone enabled real time and fast end of period book close
(from more than 8 days down to a few days) and provided
real time financial results based on operational effect
versus pre-conversion book close data which was delivered
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three weeks after the end of the month. In addition,
managers at all level of the enterprise had access to
operational data and customer visibility for the first time.

Lucent Technologies Press Release [2000], “Northwestern
Corporation’s Expanets division buys U.S. small and
mid-sized business sales group from Lucent
Technologies.”
Celestica Press Release [2001], “Celestica Announces Five
Year U.S. $4 Billion Global Strategic Alliance with
Avaya.”
SEC 10K405 Report [2001], Commission File Number
001-15951.
SEC 10K Report [2002], Commission File Number 00115951.
Francesco, Thomas A [1998], Transforming Lucent’s
CFO.” Strategic Finance.
Avaya Communications [2001], “Avaya System
Conversion to SAP: Important Message to Enterprise
Voice and Octel Messaging Business Partners.”
Avaya, Inc. Press Release [2003], “Avaya Reports First
Fiscal Quarter 2003 Results.”

The new architecture was structured around a few primary
vendor products, including SAP, Trilogy, and Seibel
There were now standard global business processes and
global people processes. The technological structure could
be upgraded as the business strategy evolved.
There were some unintended consequences. As the firm
spun off from Lucent Technologies, it became clear that
the infrastructure of mainframe and server data centers,
desktop and laptop PCs, hotline support, and applications
support was unnecessarily too high (approximately 9+% of
revenue in 1999) and the new applications structure
required a far simpler IT infrastructure and resulted in
lower IT costs. In addition, the new architecture enabled
the construction of an e-customer, e-supplier, and eassociate based backbone and provided a modular business
model to support future acquisitions or divestitures and to
in-source or outsource business functions as required by
the needs of the business. Finally, the streamlining of the
infrastructure eliminated the internal handoffs and quality
checks required of a functionally based process and
systems architecture. This final step has provided the basis
by which Avaya’s breakeven point has been reduced to
$1.075 billion (Avaya 2003).
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